

## Message Text

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10  
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11  
SAA-01 SES-02 /067 W  
-----086161 141236Z /53

R 131010Z AUG 78  
FM USINT BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6591  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BAGHDAD 1686

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS( PEPR, IZ  
SUBJECT: FAHD VISIT

REF: BAGHDAD 1600

1. WELL-INFORMED DIPLOMATS ADVISE THAT THE VISIT OF PRINCE FAHD TO BAGHDAD CAN BE CONSIDERED AN OUTSTANDING SUCCESS. THE FEELING OF RESPECT AND TRUST THAT EXISTS BETWEEN FAHD AND SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE (AT THE TIME) FALTERING SADAT PEACE INITIATIVE, AND IRAQI RECOGNITION THAT PERHAPS SOME FORM OF INTER-ARAB UNITY WAS BETTER THAN NONE AT ALL REPORTEDLY CONVERGED IN A MANNER THAT PERMITTED AN ACCOMMODATION THAT HAS BEEN HOPED-FOR BUT NOT EXPECTED.

2. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE DECISION TO VISIT BAGHDAD WAS REACHED IN CAIRO AND WAS MADE, AT LEAST IN PART, AT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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SADAT'S BEHEST. THE INTENTION WAS TO SECURE IRAQI AGREEMENT TO REDUCE PUBLIC TENSIONS WITH EGYPT--AND OTHERS. ONE OF THE CONCRETE STEPS WHICH THE GOI WAS REPORTEDLY ASKED TO TAKE WAS THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SADAT TRIAL, WHICH WAS INDEED POSTPONED, FOR WHATEVER REASON. (WE ARE ALSO TOLD THAT FAHD REFUSED TO GO TO CAIRO UNLESS THE ISRAELI MILITARY DELEGATION WAS FIRST

SENT HOME. WE DEFER TO EMBASSY CAIRO ON THIS ONE.)

3. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCES, THE IRAQIS AGREED TO MANDATE THE SAUDIS TO WORK OUT A MEANS OF UNIFYING ARAB RANKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE ISSUED, ON A BASIS TO WHICH THE GOI COULD SUBSCRIBED WITHOUT TOTALLY ABANDONING ITS PRINCIPLES. SADAT WOULD NOT HAVE TO ADMIT HIS INITIATIVE HAD FAILED, BUT JUST ABANDON IT QUIETLY AND LET IT DIE. THE UNEXPECTED FLEXIBILITY DISPLAYED BY SADDAM IS GIVEN AS THE REASON FOR LENGTHENING FAHD'S VISIT FROM A FEW HOURS TO AN OVERNIGHT STOPOVER.

4. THE PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF SAUDI SUPPORT FOR THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT IS EXPLAINED HERE AS A REFLECTION OF THE NEW SAUDI MANDATE, FROM IRAQ AND OTHERS, WHICH PERMITS GREATER FLEXIBILITY. IF THE SUMMIT PRODUCES THE SORT OF FORWARD MOMENTUM THE ARABS CAN ACCEPT, THEN THERE IS NO PROBLEM. SHOULD IT FAIL, THEN SADAT WILL HAVE LITTLE REASON TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS. IN EITHER CASE, THE ARABS WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO CLOSE RANKS.

5. COMMENT: IT IS NOT A SECRET THAT SADAT HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE FOR SOME TIME TO STEP BACK FROM HIS CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL. MODERATES AS WELL AS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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RADICALS HAVE URGED SUCH A MEASURE, AND FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS. ARAB UNITY, EVENT CIRCUMSCRIBED UNITY, IS ANOTHER OBJECTIVE SHARED BY MANY COUNTRIES, WITH VARYING DEFINITIONS AND OBJECTIVES. IF IRAQ HAS INDEED SUBSCRIBED TO A GENERALIZED SAUDI FORMULATION ON THESE TWO SUBJECTS, IT COULD BE A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION. THE NEXT FEW WEEKS MAY PROVIDE A CLEARER PICTURE.  
PECK

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NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, MINISTERIAL VISITS  
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**Draft Date:** 13 aug 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
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**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Original Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 BAGHDAD 1600  
**Retention:** 0  
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**Review Content Flags:**  
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**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
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**Review Release Date:** N/A  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
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